University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and
Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

2-20-1956

Review of Foreign Policy II - U.S. and Southeast Asia
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Review of Foreign Policy II - U.S. and Southeast Asia" (1956). Mike Mansfield
Speeches, Statements and Interviews. 177.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/177

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University
of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

J~[L~

Sp.!.!!:ch of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
• For Release on Delivery

f£.B 1 o\956
REVIEW OF FOREIGN POLICY - II
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. President:
In recent weeks members of the Senate have addressed themselves
to the question of the need for a review of the foreign policies of the nation.
When I discussed the question here in the Senate on January 20th, I made this
statement:
I intend to raise the is sues of foreign policy
on the floor at intervals throughout the session. I hope
to do so in the spirit of national responsibility and with out challenging the integrity or the patriotism of any
individual or the political party now in control of the
Executive Branch of the government. I will be only too
glad to give credit, where credit is due . By the same
token, however, I do not propose to ignore or g1os s
over the shortcomings, weaknesses and inadequacies of
foreign policy as I see them.
Mr. President, it is in that spirit that I shall attempt to make a
contribution to the review today .
Let me begin by saying that I believe that there is only one valid
justification for the enormous and costly responsibilities which this country has
assumed throughout the world in the last decade.

Peace for this country has

become increasingly inseparable from peace everywhere.

The fate of our free-

dom is linked to that of freedom elsewhere in the world.
I do not share the views of those who contend that some sort of
mystical world leadership compels us to act abroad in every situation.

I do not

agree with those who hold that we must assert this leadership by flexing our

..
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nuclear or vocal muscles at the slightest provocation.

Nor do I agrc .... w1th

those who argue that this same leadership requires us to spend billions simply
to prove that we are more generous than the Russians.
On the other hand, I have no common ground with those who ignore
the vast changes which have take n place in the international position of the
United States.

We are in this world -- this small, crowded, dangerous and

promising world -- whether we like it or not.
splendor will insulate us from its currents.

No ancient dream of isolated
That was a fine dream and an

appealing one, that nineteenth century dream of a safe and contented America,
removed from the troubles of the rest of the world.

It has not been the leaders

-- Republicans or Democrats -- in the White House or the Department of State
who have shattered it.

Rather, it has been the scientists and the technologists

of whom this country has produced its share and of whom we are justifiably proud
For those -- and I believe only a few r emain -- for those who still persist in
_that dream of i-solation._ unmoved by the j-et planes ·· and gui.ded missiles overhead,
I suppose there will be no awakening except for that instant of reality before som •
nuclear h.olo.caust blasts us all into extinction .
What I am trying to say is that the United States cannot escape
from the realities of this era of human history.

If we cannot retreat into a

nonexistent Fortress America, however , neither can we charge out in every
direction with bombast, billions or bombs .

If we are to have effective policies,

it seems to me that we cannot assume that either action or inaction in foreign

policy is of itself good or desirable.

We have got to measure every major
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activity against two general standards.

Does the activity contribute to the

preservation of peace and the security of

fr~edom?

Does it contribute to these

t:nds in reasonable degree commensurate with the costs?
It is against those two standards that I ask the Senate today to

examine with me the policies which we are following in Southeast Asia.
not lack for information on the situation there.
formed a great public
the region.

scrvic~

We do

The American press has per-

in keeping the nation informed on developments in

It is a region, moreover, which Senators in increasing numb e rs hav<

visited in recent years so that even from within our own midst we have several
first-hand observations.
I recall mt:eting the distinguish~d minority leader /M r . Knowland/
there in 1953 and I know that the able Senator from Washington j_Mr. Jackso.!!7
has only

r ec~ntly

returned from the area.

Others who come readily to mind as

having visited the area in recent years include the Senator from Rhode Island
j_Mr. Gree_!!7. the Senator from Iowa j_Mr. Hickenloopc~7, the Senator from New
Hampshire [M.r. Bridge=./. the Senator from Illinois j_Mr. Dirksen/, the Senator
from N(.w Jersey j_Mr. Smit~7, the Senator from Louisiana j_Mr. Ellende;}. the
Senator from Washington [M.r. Magnuso.!!7, the Senator from Kentucky j_Mr.
Clements7, and others.
Until recent years Southeast Asia has been on the whole remote from
our awareness.

Except for the Philippines over which this country exercised

sovereignty, the area was largely a preserve of the European powers.

For

decades and in some cases -centuries ... .ancient nations of the region. were colonios.

- 4 The United •<ingdom held Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Ceylon and oth ers.
Indochina, the French were predominant.

In

Indonesia was under Dutch control.

The Portuguese ruled in seve r al areas.
Whatever its virtues, colonialism pr0 duced the enmities of inequality.
It produced these enmities in varying degrees among all the peoples of Southeast

Asia .

It produced them generally in direct ratio to the reluctance of the Europeat

powers to provide avenues to eventual equality and freedom for these peoples.
Let us face that fact in all honesty,

The past is past 1-- ut we shall

never bur y it until we are prepared to face it.
of P sia became colonial preserves.

There were reasons why regions

It wiLL not serve the cause of present

understanding for us in the r'{estern wor l d to de l ude ourse lves with the pious
belief that only selfless motives led to the expansion of Western influence into
Asia.

There were such motives to be sure; but there was also the excessive zeal

for gain and p, wer which characterized the Nestern nations, including Russia,
in the nineteenth century.
By the same token, it will not serve the cause of present understanding
for this generation of Asians to ignore the shortcomings which existed in their
cc,untries at the time they became colonies.

Nor will it serve that cause for •.hem

to turn their backs now e n the real social and economic contributions which the
Western nations have made to their societies ,
It comes with particular ill-grace to find the present Soviet leaders

attempting -- as Messrs . ~{hrushchev and Bulganin did o n their recent Asian tour
-- to find them attempting to pour salt on these old sores cf colonialism .

Have
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they forgotten that their forebears were among the most voracious in extending
w~ stern

dom1nation in Asia?

And for all their words about national independence

there is little indication that the present Soviet leaders have abandoned the
predatory habits of their fathers.
tangible evid..,ncc that they have.

We will look in vain in Central Asia for some
What subject people of the Russians

hav~

direct

contact with the new Asian nations to the south and east?
Whatever may have been the situation prior to World War II, the fact
is that Western colonialism is dead or dying throughout Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia of yesterday is no more.

The

Where once there were colonies, there

are now free nations -- some ten of them within a compass marked roughly by
China on

th~

north, the Pacific on the east, Australia on the south and India on th

west.
This region of Southeast Asia is the size of Western Europe and is
even less populated.

It is rich in minerals and petroleum and it contains some

of the most fertile agricultural lands in the world .
Although each is a d1stinct national entity, the countries of Southeast
Asia
/arc linked by ties which grow out of a common heritage and many common prob lems.
world.

Together thuse countries make up one of the major political regions of the
And together with other peoples in Asia and Africa - - new nations and

nations coming into being -- they constitute a powe r ful force in the flow of world
events.
That was the significance of the Bandung Conference of AsianAfrican nations last year.

It was not, as some treated it, a popularity contest
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between the Soviet Union and ourselves.

It is trut:: that we were criticized by

several of the nations at the conference and we wer\! praised by others.
were the Russians.

So, too,

We were elated at the praise and dismayed by the criticism.

So, too, presumably were the Russians .

I suppose that is understandable.

It

seems to me, however, that if we wish to develop sound policies, we would do
well to concern ourselves less with applause and criticism which are the food
and gall of actors and more with the deeper forces which are operating in these
countries,

We can hardly hope to compete with the Russians as actors; I trust

that those responsible for the conduct of this nation's foreign policy can excel
them in statesmanship and sincerity.
The deeper forces which motivate Southeast Asia were clearly revealed at Bandung and they are reflected in the policies of virtually all the
nations of that region .

They are forces which arise from a deep devotion to

national independence, from a desire for progress in a material sense and from
a more distant, but nonetheless. .real, goal of responsible and humane governmen
These are forces powerful and sweeping enough to drive millions of people into
action.

There are other factors -- ideologies and dreams of ancient grandeur,

for example.

These affect the situation in Southeast Asia.

They sometimes tend

to obscure the basic forces but they do not change them.
National independence, material progress and responsible and humar.
government - - thcs e are the drives which have spurred the vast changes in South
east Asia during the past decade.

And they will continue to dominate

developments in that region in the decades that lie ahead.
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The policiE:s of this country must take these forc"'s fully into consid~ration .

Th~y

must also take into consideration still another factor.

Each

gov~rnment

in Southeast Asia has its own concepts of how to pursue its national

objectives.

Sometimes these concepts will not be in accord with our own.

When

there arc variations betwee.n thdr vit.ws and ours as to how to proceed, we can
propound, we can propose, and we can palliate.

There 1s one course we cannot

afford to take, in all due rc.spect to their independence and our national dignity.
w~

cannot afford to follow a foreign policy based on pique or pleasure with the

words of this Asian kader or that.

What we do now in our r elations with South-

east Asia will have a significanc.:: for this country long after the contemporary
leaders both there and here have passed from the scene.
More important than current disagreements over methods and personalities is the fact that thare is nothing inconsistent as between the objectives
of the Southeast Asian people and our long-range interests.

Their objectives are

in many ways a replica of our own basic national aspirations.

We too have

struggled through revolution and wars to establish and to preserve national
independence.
our history.

We too have sought material progress from the earliest days of
We too have worked to perfect our political institutions.

As the new nations of Southeast Asia progress toward their basic
objectives, this nation gains in the process.

Why is that the case?

To begin

with, one of our principal concerns with respect to Southeast Asia is a security
interC;st.

It is a legitimate interest, for it was into the weakness of Southeast

As1a that the militarists of World War II

pen~trated

as a precondition for their
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attack on the United Sta ks.
of their

ind~p~ndencc.,

As the Southeast Asian nations str..,ngthcn the bases

>ur own security is increased.

We also have an interest in the material
Asia.

developm~.;nt

of Southeast

The people of Asia are not without their genius and crcattve energy.

Their magnificent achievem..:nts of the past -- and there are many --

sugge~t

the dynamic contribution which these people can make to the general enrichment
of mankind in the modern era.

Out of their development, moreover, can come

growing opportuniti.:s for mutually beneficial trade and exchange.

Our total

commerce with Western Furopt-, an area of comparabl e siz.:! and population, was
over $7 billion in 1955.

With Southeast Asia, it was $3 billion .

The difference

only begins to suggest the ultimate possibiliti<.:s of trade if Southeast Asia
develops in an t::conomic sense .
We have finally an interest in

th~

po liti cal progress of Southeast Asia.

Let me emphasize, h o w ever, the distinction between interest and interference in
these matters.

It is cne thing to look with sympathy on the adoption of American

concepts of democracy by others .
to them.

It is another to attempt to sell these

concept~>

A number of the new governments of Southeast Asia reflect the

of the Am.:rican C:onstitution, th<:;
state papers.

D~claration

influenc~

of Independence and other groat

That is a mark of recognition of the universality of our greatest

political minds .

It ought to be a sour ct. of both pridl.! and humility to this

generation of Americans.

It is a disgraceful disrespect, howev"'r, to talk of

exporting ou r system of government or the American way as though it wer e some
article of commerce to be marketed by Madison Avt-nue.

- 9 Let the Chinese and other communist nations persist in that false
sense of mission which requires them to force th ei r own peculiar systems on the
unreceptive.

It does not serve the int e rests or the dignity of this country to
w~

suggest that

emulate it.

There ar.:: signs that over the past decade the Southeast Asian
countries have moved towards all three of their basic objectives .

I base this

observation on my visit to Southeast Asia l ast fall and on reports by other
members of Congress and by press correspondents.
unmistakable signs of progress.
internal order now prevails.

Th e re are limited but

In most countries a tolerable measure of

The great threat of a communist

~ilitary

advance

through Indochina into the balance of Southeast Asia has receded, at least for
the moment.

Product1on of crops is rising.

New industries are being developed.

Commodities from Japan and the Western nations are appearing in the markets
of Southeast Asia in increased supply.

P erhaps most significant, free elections

were held last year in virtually every country in the region.

In some cases,

these were the first general dection.s with nniversal suffrage eve r to take place
in these nations.

Whatever their shortcomings, they typify the zealous search

for more responsible government which is going on in most of the Southeast Asian
countries.
We shall make a tragic error, however, if we take the first signs
of progress as assurance of a secure future for Southeast Asia.
long way from that.
across its

n~ighbors

The area is a

The shadow of the militant Chinese colossus still slants
to the south.

A lull in the conflict in Indochina is no
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guarantee that it shall not be resumed by the communists in the ncar future.

A

satisfactory rate of econom1c development by even the most elementary standards
is still lacking in most of

th~

countries.

Some of the governments in lhe area arc

plagued by a corruption and inertia whtch tend to open rather than narrow the
gulf between them and their peoples.
We have, I believe, played some small part in the progress of
Southeast Asia.

Our policies with respect to Southeast Asia have been effective

to the extent that they have been in harmony with the fundamental objectives of
the peoples of that area.

They have been effective to the extent that they have

supported the desire for secure national independence, for material progrcs s,
and for responsible political institutions.
Mr. President, I should like now to turn to the major aspects of
these policies and to their shortcomings as I see them.

Let me say first that I

recognize that policy for Southeast Asia cannot be divorced from consideration of
policy elsewhere.

The Administration, for example, may have reasons for

continuing -- as it has done --for continuing conversations between an American
Ambassador and a Chinese Communist representative for seven months in Geneva.
There may be reasons, reasons which the Administration has not seen fit to make
public, reasons of which the Senate is not aware.

Nevertheless, I know that

these conversations must be a cause of uneasiness to many members of the
Senate.
In the same way, they arc a source of uncertainty in many countries
in Southeast Asia.

Questions naturally arise there as well as in the Senate as to
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where these conversations are leading.

They have the effect of introducing a

note of uncertainty into all of our policies in that area .
The conversations e!fect also the large overseas Chinese population
in Southeast Asia, numbering several millions, who are settled in communities
like Singapore, Djakarta and Bangkok.

The loyalties of these communities have

teetered between Peking and Formosa for a decade.

What this country docs or

docs not do respecting the Chinese Communist regime exercises a very great
influence on them .
I repeat I do not question the right of the Administration to talk with
the Chinese Communists, if it so desires.
as one

~xamplc

I merely point to these conversations

of how actions by this government presumably made necessary

by conditions elsewherl.! have an inevitable impact on our policies in Southeast
Asia.

One could also point to others as, for example, the conditions which grow

out of our close relations with Western European nations .

These relations have

sometimes led to actions or statements affecting Southeast Asia which have be(,n
-- to say the

l~ast

--not well received there.

In the absence of full information, we must assume that the
Executive Branch would not make adjustments of this kind if th ey wl;.)re avoidable.
It seems to me, however, that even when due allowance is made for the

unavoidable, our policies for

South~..:ast

Asia remain characterized by an

inadequacy of understanding and an inertia of ideas.
The principal ins trumcnt of policy through which we have attempted
to assist the nations of Southeast Asia in maintaining their independence is the
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treaty that bears the name of the region.

At the rcques t of the

a delegate to the Manila Conference at which the
was drawn up.

South~ast

Asia

Presid~nt,
defens~

I was

treaty

Together with the Secretary of State and the distinguished

Senator from New Jersey i_"M.r. Smit_!::/ I signed the treaty on behalf of the
United States.

The Senate gave its consent to ratification by a vote of 82 to l.

If the Senate will recall the situation which existed in 1954 when the
treaty was considered, its significance will be appreciated.

It was signed at a

time when the communist drive into Indochina threatened to spill over into the
rest of Southeast Asia .

The treaty was int ended primarily to rally the will of

other Asian nations to protect their independence and t o resist a further advanc\.l
of communist totalitarianism.
I signed that treaty and I cast my vote for its -ratification.

I did so

with a full awareness of its limitations.
I signed because I believed the treaty served a useful purpose in
terms of this nation's interest in peace and in fr eedom .
to do so.

I believe it continues

And so long as we remain a party to it, the obligation& which we have

assumed under it must remain inviolate.
Situations change, however, and as they do we must be prepared to
adjust this treaty as well as other polici<:s accordingly .

The principal limitation

of the tr eaty wh en it was signed , as it is now, is that it carries too heavy a
r e lianc e for the defense of Southeast Asia on nations outside the area.

It has,

moreover, yet to secure the participation of nations like India, Burma, Ceylon
and Indonesia whose interests in the area are in many ways more direct than our

- 13 -

own .

Finally, it has aroused some fears in Southeast Asia that the old ghost

of Western colonialism may emerge in a new form.

These fears are unfounded

but we cannot ignore their effect on the nations which have them .
The limitations of the treaty have never been a secret.
been discus sed many times in the press.

They have

What disturbs me is not so much the

limitations themselves as the apparent unwillingness of the Executive Branch to
face them and its inertia in taking steps to deal with them .
In addition to the Southeast Asia defense treaty, this country is
supplying military aid to a number of countries in the reg10n to assist them in
building the defenses of their national independence.
of assistance of this kind .

I have supported programs

On repeated occasions, however, I have stressed the

need for extreme caution and responsibility in employing this arm of foreign
policy.

That such caution and responsibility were not being employed became

unmistakably clear to me last summer when I brought to the attention of the
Senate the shoddy procedures in allocating funds under these programs.
Senate will recall that of some $3 billion

appropriat~d

The

for the year for military

aid, the Defense Department obligated about $700 million, or roughly 25 percent
of these funds, in the last 24 hours of their expiring authority to do so.
We have got to face the fact that military aid is a two -edged sword .
We hav.:! been told many times of its virtues.

We have not been sufficiently

alerted to its dangers.
I tell the Senate in all candidness that I was dismayed at some of the
reports from responsible quarters which reached me while I was in Southeast Asia
According to these r .. ports, nola small part of the weapons used in the Viet Minh
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advance in Vietnam and Laos were of American manufacture.

They had come

into communist hands via defections and defeats of forces we had armed, via

th~

smuggling trade in Wt:!apons and by supply from Communist Ch1na.
I do not know how significant this factor of weapons supplied by us
being turned against us and friendly nations is in the total picture in Asia.
Perhaps we shall never know.

One thing is certain, however, that it is not

without significance and I have yet to see those who are responsible for the
administration of these aid programs demonstrate sufficient awareness of its
significance.
I believe this body cannot <:mphasize too strongly the need of extreme
caution in tendering military aid to any country.

At the least, I believe we must

make certain that it goes to governments only in quantities and of a kind that
they can use effectively to meet a

g~nuine

military threat.

I believe further that

it should go to governments that are striving, as in South VietNam and the
Philippines, to base themselves strongly in their own peoples.

In the long run,

only such governments are likely to survive in Southeast Asia and only such
governments make reliable allies.
I turn now to the second maJor aspect of American policy respecting
Southeast Asia which is aid-other-than-military.

I apologize to the Senate for

the use of this cumbersome term but I can find no

oth~r.

Aid-other-than-

military, as I use it, emb races such euphonies as direct forces support, defense
support, development assistance, technical assistance, the President's Fund for
Asian economic

developm~nt,

all of which have been coined to describe various

activities of the government in providing

assistanc~;

abroad.
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I mention these terms not to embarnass the lexicographers of the
Executive Branch but merely to emphasize what I believe to be the major
problem in this aspect of our policy.

The "aid-other-than-military 11 program

in Southeast Asia, in a phrase, is bogged down in bureaucracy.
I believe assistance programs have a place in the foreign policies
of this government, provided the emphasis is on mutuality, provided they fill a
genuine need, and provided they are judiciously and e xpertly administered.

I

have seen technical assistance programs run on under a million dollars as in
Nepal several years ago.

There a handful of American technicians were per-

forming an admirable service in the interests of that country and the United
States .

I have seen oth-ers involving tens of millions of dollars which were the

height of futility.
I repeat, I believe this country can serve its own interests as well
as those of Southeast Asian countries through aid programs but the level of
expenditures is not ' the real measure of utility.

It is the manner-in which funds

arc expended that is the critical is sue.
I tell the Sen.ate. frankly that 1 am distur.bed when I am told -- as I was
told several months ago --by the Prime Minister of a Southeast Asian country
that

11

the improvement in relations between your country and mine dates from the

discontinuance at my request of your aid program. ' 1
What li es behind a comment like that made in all sincerity by an
outstanding Asian leader?

How are we to reconcile this fact with requests from

the Ex..,cutive Branch for long-range aid programs and increased expenditures?
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I believe we must go back to the fundamental drives in Southeast

i£ we are to understand the Prime Minister's comment and the existing shortcomings in the aid program which, instead of correcting,

th~

Administration

appears bent on compounding.
Th(~

Southcas t Asian peoples s<.ek material progress, it is true.

'fh,•

seek it, however, within the framework of their two other fundamental obj\..Cttves
within the framework of national independence and responsible government.
These objectives -- all of them -- cannot be reconciled

unl~ss

the initiative for

economic development in South0ast Asia comcs preponderantly from the peoples
of that area.

They do not desir;.; a material progress that is made to

ord~r

for

them in the United States, in Soviet Russia, or anywhere else.

They do not

desire it so desperately that they can be bought by either side.

If they could,

they would hardly be worth the buying.

Aid programs, moreover, no matter how

largt! the amount, no matter how much scintillating surface progress it may
produce, will not serve the interests of the people of that area or our interests
unless its benefits reach the people.
peopl~

And unless it serves the interests of the

and not the {ew, it does not serve our interests.
I r\..gret to say so but the argurr.cnt that is often made to the effect

that we must outbid the Russians in offers of a1d to Southeast Asia reflects little
credit on us or on the nations of that

an~ a.

I am sure that the argument is made

in good faith, out of a genuine desire to help.

It is an argumenl, however,

which demeans us b.:caus~ it demeans the peoples of Southeast Asia.

The dl:cent

the self-respecting, the ind.::.pendent in Southeast Asia will resent the implication
· that they can be bought.
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The argument that we must outb1d

th~

Russians is as invalid as the

demand that aid be limited only to those who agree with us in every instance or
who speak the words which flatter us .

Has this country so departed from its

basic principles, have its citizens so forgotten their training from earliest
childhood that we would make

gen~rosity

contingent upon a grovelling gratitude?

I do not think we have, but sometimes those who speak of these matters make it
sound as though we

hav~.

If competition with the Russians is not the sole criterion for aid
programs, neither is an absolute alignment with us or an adoration of us - - real
or professed- - the criterion .
lifetime.

Policies change.

Leaders go on, at most, for a

The real interests of this nation -- interests which·members of the

Senate must consider and safeguard -- are more enduring than that brief span.
In these terms, the criteria of any aid program is: does it serve our
interests by aligning itself with the desires of the peoples of Southeast Asia for
nc1tton.al independence, for material progress, and for responsib l e and humane
government.

RE•gardlPss how an·liable the recipients, it does not serve our

interests if it encourages dependl.nce rather than independence; if it becomes
a means for irresponsible governments to become increasingly irr'-!sponsible .
In general, I believe rational programs of technical assistance, of
this government or the United Nations, administered without political strings,
serve the long-range interests of this government.

Congress sponsored that

type of activity when it established the technical assistance program in 1950.
is the only type of long-range continuing grant aid which Congress has ever
endorsed.

It
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With

r~spect

to other aid programs, however, it s-::ems to ml! lhat

each situation must be judged on its merits as it arises.

In certain cases, as

in South VietNam for example, where a difficult economic transition is being
made under constant communist pressure, additional assistance may be
warranted in our inte rc:sts.

Such aid programs, however, must be clearly

designed to achieve a given purpose over a set period of time.

They should not

carry an implication of a continuing, general commitment by this country.

If other foreign assistance in economic development is required by
Southeast Asia beyond that which is now available through existmg credit
facilities, then it seems to me preferable that it be financed by long-term loans
of the most generouo terms, rather than as grants.

Loans carry no implication

of dependency, and I believe the Southeast Asian nations would prefer them to
grants .

It is strange, to say the least, that the agitation for grants seems to

arise more in the Executive Branch in th1s country than in Southeast Asia itself.
I should like to-tuTn-now to ooe other question before concluding.
The contention is often made that we must increase not only our military and non-

military aid, but also our so-called psychological activity.

I am not sure that I

understand precisely what increasing psychological activity means but I assume it
has something to do with multiplying the output of words printed or spoken since
the United States Information Agency is seeking $50 million in additional appropriations, or a 57 percent increase over the current year.

It would be

interesting to know how many addit10nal words can be produced for that sum.
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Some years ago the able Senator from Arkansas /Mr. Fulbrigh_:/
and the able Senator from Iowa j_Mr. Hickenloope_:./ headed an investigation of
this program which helped to reorganize it on a sound and reas onable basis.

It

appears now that the Administration desires to return it to a basis of sound and
fury.
There is a place for an intelligent information and exchange program
in supporting and disseminating the .foreign policies of this nation in Southeast
Asia.

The Fulbright Program and the Smith-Mundt Program for the exchange

of persons. for example, are a credit to this nation and to the farsightedness of
the Se nators whose nam es they bear.

The American libraries abroad, which

the Senator from Iowa j_Mr. Hickenloope.:_7 did so much to safeguard and improve
provide valuable services for the country and its commerce and other relations
with these countries.

I am sure there is even a place for radio and press and

other modern information services in supporting American policies, provided
they are handl<>d with intelligence and restraint.
Th~r e

is no place for any information program, however, regardless

of its intent, which suggests, by its very magnitude, a cultural offensive on the
part of this nation.

To those who would say lhat we should do more in this

connection, I can only r eply that in my opinion what we are already doing comes
perilously close to the border of

exc~ss.

Our desire to make them know is

understandable but in the process we must not cheapen the finest ideals and the
del.!pest beliefs of this nation.
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I ask the members to

consid~r

wh1ch I believe will make this clear.

'.''hat would be the reaction in your state or

in mine to occasional visits of Buddhist
universities?

for a moment certain questions

pri~sts

from Ca;·nbodia to study at our

I think we would b..: honored by such visits, that we would welcome

them, if the visitors lived-- as they would- - simply and unassurningly in our
midst.

I should think we would react the same way if they

maintain~:;d

in our

midst a small library to which Americans could go to study life and culture in
their country .

The examples could be multiplied but what I am trying to make

clear is that there could be a real utility, an enrichment of our life by activities
of that kind and most of us would welcome it.
But suppose twenty or thirty Cambodians descended on your state
with the printing presses, the radios and the other paraphernalia of modern
communications .

Suppose they subjected you day after day, month after month,

and year after year to an unceasing flow of words on the vi-rtues of Cambodian
.--

iife and the evils of some other way.

You might agree, I am sure, that

Cambodian life was indeed virtuous .

But I also believe that you would begin to

wonder why these Cambodians had come to your state and after a while you
would begin to wonder when they were going home.

Should we assume that

Cambodians, Burmese, or any other peoples will act any differently to the
presence in their midst of a substantial body of foreigners or of an offensive of
words whether it comes from the United States, Soviet Russia, or any other
country?
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To those that would say that this is a cheap way to stop communism
I can .; nly reply

thcr~ i~

no cheap way nor is

ther~::

even an expensive way in

Southeast Asia if it depends primarily on the initiative and energy of this country.
No c :>untry in that region or any other region will avoid totalitarianisrr
primarily throu gh our efforts .

Nations find freedom because thL:y have the will

to freedom and the native leaders to guide them effectively towards its promise.
We delude ourselves if we believe that we can substitute either for that will or
that Leadership.

w~

will do more harm than good if in Southeast Asia we seek to

supply our words and our deeds for the words and deeds that must come only
irom the peopll:!s directly involved.
Mr. President, I have compl eted my review of the Southeast Asian
situation .

I should like now merely to summarize the conclusions in terms of our

policies to which this review has led me.
1.

The United States should make clear that it stands solidly behind

our present obligations under the Southeast Asia defense treaty.

At the same

time, however, we should also make clear that we are always prepared to consider a reduction in our role in the defense of that area under certain conditions.
The conditions are either a recession in the totalitarian threat to Southeast Asia
or the

strength~ning

conc~rned

of its

def~nses

to the treaty or by other
2.

by the accession of nations more directly
d~fl!nsive

arrangements.

The Executive Branch should make a careful re-examination of

the premises under which it dispenses military aid.

It must bring into its

calculations more emphatically than 1t has in the past such factors as genuine
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need and capacity of recipient governments in terms of their defense and

th~

degree of rl.!sponsibility which they show to th-::ir own pl.loplcs.
Further, the Executive Branch should report as fully as possible
to the American people on the extent to which American '"'quipmcnt has fallen
into the hands of the communists in Asia.

If it fails to do so in the near future,

then the appropriate committees of Congress might well consider a complete
investigation of this matler.
3.

Non-military grant aid as a permanent clement of American

foreign policy should be limited, as was intended by Congress, to the Technical
As sistancc or the Point Four Program.

If the Executive Branch presents a

prosp0ctus for a useful and effective expansion of this program -- and I am not
at all sure that this is possible -- then I believe Congress should give it sympa thetic consideration.
Large-scale grants of economic aid to any country, when necessitated
by unusual c ircumstances, however, shoul d be considered individually on their
own me r its by the Congress .
If the Southeast Asian and other underdeveloped countries seck long -

range aid for economic development unavai lable through .2xisting sources, such
aid should bl.! considered as far as possible for whole regions and on the basis of
r epayable credits of the most generous terms .

The Execut1ve Branch should

present specific proposals in this connection and not seek a permanent blank
check which reveals little of the extc:nt to which this country might be committed
without th e clear understanding of the American p.::!ople and the consent of the
Senate and Congress as a whole.

R._.k'i!I~
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POLICY MID SOUll·!EAS ... ASIA

President:
In recent \-Teeks members of the Sena!.e have addressed

themselves to the question of the need for a revievf of the foreign
policies of the nation.

:'/hen I discussed the question here in the

Ser.ate on January 20th, - made this statement :
I intend to raise the issues of foreign policy
on the floor at intervals throughout the session. I )lope
to do so in the spirit of natlonal rP;)ponsibility and
l-tithout challenging the lnt<o.grity or Lhe patriotism of any
individual or the political party now in control of the
Executive Branch of the government . I will be only too
glad to give credit, \mere credit- L due . "")y the "'a.n
token , hovTeve_·, I do not propose to ignore o.. J.~..Osd over
the shortcomings , weaknesses and inadequa.;i . . of fo!"eign
policy as I see them.
President , it is in that spirit that I shall attempt to

~r .

make a cor . . ribution to the review today.
Let

~p

begin by

s~~ng

that I believe that there is only one

VaLid justification for the enor ous and costly responsibilities which
this country has

ass~~ed

throughout the world in the last decade .

Peace for this country has become increasir.gly inseparable fro
evexy..rhere .

peace

'Ihe fate of our fr edom is linked to that of freedom

else·,rhere in the world .

- 3 the technologists of

who~

this

whom ·'le are justifiably proud .

count~J

has produced its

~har-

and of

or those -- and I beL.eve only a few

reinain -- for those who still persist in that dream of isolation,
un oved by the jet

pl~~es

and

~uided

missiles overhead , I suppose

there will be no a\·Takening except for that instant of reality befor e
some nuc:ear holocaust blasts us all into extinction .
'What I am trying to say is that the United States cannot
escape from the realities of this era of

hurr~

history.

If we cannot

retreat into a nonexistent Fortress America, however , neither ca.."1 He
charge out in every direction \'lith bo1:1bast , billions or bo.1bs .

If

we are tc have effective policies , it seems to me that we cannot
aosume that either action or inaction in foreign policy is of itself
good or desirabl •

re

have got to measure every major activity

against two general standards .

Does the activity contribute to the

preservation of peace and the security of freedo1 .. ?

Does it contribute

to these ends in reasonable degree comffienuurate with the

cos~v ?

- 4It is against those two standards that I ask the Senate
today to examine •.'lith me the 1:o1icies which we are following in
Southeast Asia.
therP .

The

\'le co not lack for information on the situation

~~erican

press has performed a great public service in

keeping the nation inforj ted on developments in the region .
region,

~orcover,

which Senators in increasing

in recent year::; so that even !'ro:n

~d. thin

n~~bers

our o-...n midst

It is a

have visited

h'e

have

several first - hand observations .
I recall meeting the distinguished minority leader L!~ .

vnovrlanij t1ere in 1953 and I know that the able Senator fro::n
~~shington LVr . Jacksori7 has only recently returned from the area .

Others ,.mo

COl.le

readily t-o mind as having visited the area in recent

ye3.I's include the Senator from Rhode Island ["rr . Greeri7, the Senator
from Io-...;a

f":r .

HickenloopPy, ~.he Senator from NeH Hampshire

t•idgei/, the Senator from Illinois

ff1I' . Dirksen1 the Senator

- '

- 5Until recent years Southeast Asia has been on the whole
re .ote from our awareness .

Except fo!' the Philippines over ,.,.hich this

countr.;· exercised sovereignty, the area was largely a
European

prese:~e

of the

For decades and in some cases centuries , ancient

po~rer~ .

/

nations of the region 'vere colonies ., rhe United Kingdom held burma,
1·:ala.ya, Singapore , Ceylon and others .
predominant .

In Indochina, the French were

Indonesia was under ::>utch co· t,rol.

'Ihe Portuguese ruled

L, several areas .
Whatever its virtues , colonialism produced the enmities of
inequality.

-t produced these enmities in varJing degrees among all

the peoples of Southeast Asia.

It producec them generally in direct

ratio to the reluctance of the European pm...-ers to provide avenues to
eventual equality and freedom for these peoples .
Let us face
vre

;3hall

~hat

fact in all honesty.

rhe past is past but

nevar bury it until we are prepared to face it .

reasons why regions of Asia
serve the cau.,

bec~Le

colonial preserves .

There ;·;ere

It vdll not

of present understanding for us in the iestern vrorld

- 6to delude ourselves with the pious belief that only elfl
led to the expansion of !<>stern influ nc into Asia.
o ive ... to be sure; but ther
and po

~r ~~ich

There

re such

was also the exce..,sive z a1 for gain

characterized the restern nat:ons , includin

ussia,

in the nineteenth century.
B.y the

s~T:e

token , it

~dll

not serve the cause of pre ent

understanding for this eeneration of As:ans to ignore the shortcocings
which existed in their countries at the time they became colonies .
Nor will it serve that cause for theo to turn their backs now on the
real social antl economic contributions rm.i.ch the Western nations have
mad<> to their societies .
It comes ldth particular ill- grace to find the present Soviet

leaders attempting -- as 'iessrs . Khrushchev and Bulganin did on their
recent Asian tour -- to find the.:n attempting to pour salt on these old

sores of coloni.!ism.
among the

Ha~they forgotten

thnt their forebears

b~re

ost voracious in extending \:estern do :ir.ation in Asia?

- 7And for all their \'rords about national independence , there is little
indication that the prasent Soviet leaders have abandoned the
predatory habits of their father;:. .

itle

wlll look in vain in Central

Asia for some tang.:.ble evidence that they hav , •

·!hat subject people

of the Russians have direct contact 'lr.i th the ne,.,. Asian nations to the
south and east?
1!'hatever may have been the situation prior t.o ·.vorld far II ,
the fact is that Western colonialism is dead or dying throughout
Southeast Asia.

The Southeast Asia of yesterday is no more .

\;here

once there were colonies , there are now free nations - - some 10 of them
within a

co~pass

marked roughly

l~

China on the north , the ?acif.:.c on

the east , Australia on the south and India on the vrest .
This region of Southeast Asia is the size of "</estern Europe
and is even less

popula~ed .

It is rich in

it contains some

of

fertil~

l·torld .

the most

~inerals

and petroleum and

agricultural lan1s in the

- 8 Al~hough

j

each is a di .... tinct national entity, the countries

of Southeast Asia are linked by ties '1-:hich grO\·t out. of a cC>llllton
heritage and many co

~on

problems .

!Ogether these countries nake up

one of the major political regions of the 'vorld .

And together \dth

other peoples in Asia and Africa -- new nations and nations coming
into being -- they constitute a pmverful force in the flow of world
events .
That ,.,.as the significance of the Bandung Conference of
Asian- African natior.s last year .

It was not, as some treated it, a

popularity contest beh.,..ecn the Soviet Union and ourselvt:.:> •

It is true

that we were criticized by several of the nations at the conference
and

"'te

Here praised by oth&rs .

elated at the praise anG
'1-rere

th~ ~ussians .

So , too , were the Russiars .

dis~~ed

by the criticism.

I suppose that is

~o

concern ourselves less with

~ od

Jo , too , presumably

understandat~~ .

however, that if \:e w.i.sh to develop sound policies,
a~.lause

~le ~·rere

·~re

It

see~£

to me ,

would do irell

and criticism wPich are the

and gall of actors and more ;•.i.th the

dee~er

forces

'1-m~ch

are

- 9 operating in these countries .
.ussians

.lS

le

can hardly hope to corrp_te

~.nth

the

actors; I trust t!at those respons.:.ble for the conduct of

this nation's foreign policy can excel ther.1 in statesmanship and
sincerity.
The deeper forces ,.mich motivate South 'a.st A.,ia were clearly
revealed at Bandung and they are refl!"ct.e'l in the policies of
virtually all the nat::..ons of that region .

.~.hey

are forces Hhich

arise from a deep devotion to nat.:.onal independence, fr0m a desire
for progress in a material sense and from a more distant , but
nonethelews real ,

~oal

of responsible and

h~nane

government .

These

are forces pO\-rerful and sweeping enou:;h to drive millions of people
into action .

There are other factors -- ideologies and dreams of

ancient grandeur , for example .
Asia.

They

so~etL~es

.~.hese

affect the situation in Southeast

tend to obscure the basic forces but they do not

change them.
rational independenc ~ , .:.aterial progress and responsible and
humane government -

thes"! are the drives '\':hich have spurred the vast
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changes in Southeast Asia during the past decade .
continue to

do~inate

developments in that region in

And they will
~he

decajes that

lie ahead.
The policies of
into consideration.
another factor .

tr~s

country r.llst take these forces fully

They must also take into consideration still

·;ach government in Southeast Asia has its o>tm

concepts of ho\-r to pursue its national objectives .
concepts

~~11

not be in accord ·Nith our own.

Sometimes these

:11hen there are variations

between their views and ours as to how to proceed, we can propound ,
\o."e

can propose , and we can palliate .

~here

is one course

~.re

cannot

afford to take , in all due respect to their independence and our
national dignity.

·lie carmot afford to follo\-r a foreign policy based

on pique or pleasure with the words of thLs Asian leader or that.

&'"

,

i

I

I

\11hat >tro do ..,.# in qur relations with Southeast Asia will have a
\

~

significance for this country long after the contemporary leaders
both there and here have passed from the scene .

- ll Lore important than current disagreements over method!> and
personalit.:.es is the fact that there is nothing inconsistent as
between the objectives of the Southeast A. ian people and our longrange interests .

Their objectives are in · any ways a replica of our

Olm basic national

aspiration~ .

lfle

too have strug"'led through

revolution and wars to establish and to preserve

nav~or~

independence .

We too have SOU!.?;ht material progress from the earliest days of our
history. f ·le too have rrorked to perfect our political institutions .
As the new nations of Southeast Asia progress toward their
basic

obj~ctives ,

cas ?

10

begin

this nation gains in the process .

~~th ,

Southeast A-:>ia i3 a

one of

ou~

principal

ecuy•ity interest .

co~cerns

Why is

tha~ th~

with respect

~o

It is a leeiti.mate interest ,

for it Has into the weakness of Southeast Asia that the militarists of
\'/orld -..[ar r: penetrated as a precondition for thei- attack on the United
3ta+ s .

As the Southeast Asian nations strengthen the bases of their

independence , our

o~n

uecurity is increased .

- 12 -

- also have an interest in the
South ast

~~

rial

dcvclo~ent

of

1he people of As:a are not lnthout their genius

As~a .

creative energy.
there are

~t

~~d

_heir magnificent achieve ents of the past -- and

-- suggest the

dyn~~c

contribution which

t~cse

people

can make to the generai enrichment of mankind in the modern era.

Out

of their developmenv , moreover , can come gro;nne opportunities for
nrutually beneficial trade and exchange .
~~st~rn

8urope , an

a~ea

~~llion in 1955·
~....JL.1
The

1

Southeast

~sia

of comparable size and population , was over

~·lith

Southeast Asia, i t Nas

~

difference &lJggre~

Our total co-rJnerce i>r.i..th

-k A ""''1

Vl"-'C

~ $3

billion.

1-

the ultimate possibilities of trade i f

develops in an economic sense .

V.Ie have finally an interest in the political progress of

Southeast Asia.

ho\-teV~l' ,

the distinction between

interest and interference in these matters .

It is one thing to loo

•r.i..th

c~~pathy

others .

Let me emphasize ,

on the

adop~ion

of

A~erican

concepts of democracy by

It is another to attempt to sell these concepts to the::..

l

- 13 A number of the new governments of Southeast Asia reflect the
influence of the

~~erican ~onstitution ,

the Declaration of

IndepPmicnce and other great state papers .

That is a mark of

of the universality of our greatest political minds .
source of both pride

a~d

It

humilLty to this generation of

reco~•,:on

ough~ ~o

be a

A~ericans .

It :.s a disgraceful disrespect , howevE>r , t.o t alk of exporting our
syste~

of government or the American

~my

as though it

1~re

some

articl-e of commerce to be marketed by 1-Adison Avenue .
Let

~he

Chinese and other communist nations

false sense of mission
syste~s

t-~hich

on the unreceptive .

persis~

in that

requires them to force their 01-m peculiar
It does not serve the interests or the

dignity of this country to ..uggest that ',·re emulate it .
There are signs that over the past decade the Southeast
Asian countries have moved toNarjs all three of their basic objectives .
I base this

obse~av: on on~

reporto by other members of

visit to :outheast Asia last fall and on

Con~re~s

and by press correspondent.s .

fhere are limited but unmi3ta<able signs of progre .. ~ .

In most

countries a tolerable measure of internal order nou prevails .

- 14 .~.he

great thr at of a comnlU.."list 111i.li ... ary advanc

through Indoc ·

into the balance of Southeast Asia has receded, at least for the
momeut .

Production of crops is rising.

developed .

elt industries are being

Comr.lodities from Japan a.'1d the \:estern nations are

appearin· in the r..arkets of Southeast Asia in increased supply.
Perhaps mo::;t significant, free elections l·rere held last year in
virtually every country in the region .
first general
these nations .

~lections

In some cases , these uere the

ldth universal suffrage ever to take placP. in

:~1atever

their

shortco~ngs ,

they typify the zealous

search for more responsible government which is going on in most of
the Southeast Asian countries .
·:le shall f. rr.ake a tragic error , ho1orever , if

\o/C

take the first

signs or progress as a.,surance of a secure future for .3outheast Asia •
. . he area is a long way from that .

The shadow of the militant Chinese

colossus still slants across its neighbors to the sout'1 . 1 A lull in the
conflict in Indochina is no guarantee that .:.t shall not be resUired
the communi.:>ts in the near future .
develo~~ent

A satisfactory rate of

b~r

econo~c

by evan the most elementary standarde is still lacking in

- 15 ost of the countries .

Some of the governcents in the area are

plagued by a corruption a."ld inertia l-lhich tend to open rather t:.han
narrow the gulf between them ar1d their peoples .

re have, I believe, played some small part in the progress
of Southeast Asia.

C~r

policies with respect to SouLteasv Asia have

been effective to the extent that they have been in har.:tony with the
fu~ca~ ~tal

objectives of the peoples of that area.

They have been

effective to the extent that trey have support.ee the desire fot• secure
national independence , for material progr'3_,.., , and for responsible
political

institu~ions .

'~ .

President, ! should like now to turn to the

IT~jor

aspects of these policies and to their shortcominJs as I see them.
Let me say first that I recognize

policy for Southeast

A~ia

cannot be dl'lorced fron considerat.:.ons of policy elsehl-rere .

lhe

Adninistra~ion,

c~at

for exanple ,may have reasons for continuing - - as it

',as don -- for continuinJ conve"" ations
and a Chinese

8om~nist repr~sentative

bet~·rcen

an Arr..erican AMbassador

for seven months in Geneva.

- 16 h~~e ~-~

be reasons , reasons which the Administration has not seen

fit to nake public , reasons of which the Senate is r.ot aware .
Neverth l ess , I mow that thPse
un asiness to

~~~~

convcrsat"on~

must be a cause of

members of the Senaue .

In the same rta:y, they are a source of uncertainty in z:::any

countries in Southeast Asia.

Questions naturally arise there as \V"ell

as in the Senate as tolilere these cor.versations are leading.

.hey

have the effect of introducing a note of uncertainty into all of our
policies in that area.
The conversations effec, a: -o the larec overseas

ChL~ese

population in Southeast Asia, numbering several millions , who are
.,ettled in co!II?!l.unities like Singapore , Djakarta a.'"ld Bangkok.
loyalites of these cor.ummities have teetered bet\-.reen
-ormo~a

for a decade .

·mat this

co~~try

Pekin~

he
and

does or does not do respect:ng

the Chinese Conm.unist regime exercises a very great influence on the . •
I repeat I do not question c.hc right of the Adt:.inistration
to talk with the Chinese

Cor.m~sts , : f

i t so desires .

I merely point

to these conversations as on"' exarr.ple of hol-t actions by this eovernment.

- 17pre sur:ably r..ade nee"'.
iopact on our

sa..~:'"'"

po~icies

in

others as, fo!' exa.'ilple ,

by conditions elsewhere have an inev it. able
s~~~heast

~he

A3ia .

Or.c could also point to

conditions l'thich grow out of

relations 1;ith ·!estern ..:.'uropean n3.tions .

OU!'

close

...hn..,e relatiom have

so ,Jtime ... led to act.: ons or statel':lcnts affecting Goutheast Asia ·tlhich
have been -

to say the least -- not well received there .

In theabsence of full information , we must assume that the
::::Xecutive Branch :culd not na}:e adjustments of this kind i.f they -:. ;ere
avoidable .
~de

:t seems t.o me , ho\-rever , that even 1·then due a:lowance is

for the unavoidable , our policies for Southeast Asia re:lain

characterized by an inadequacy of understanding( an inertia of idea$ ,

'Ihe principal instrument of policy through Nhich we have
at

emptc~

to assist

~he

nations of Southeast Asia in maintaining their

independence is the treaty that bears the name of t.he region .

At the

request of the President , I was a delegate to the 1-f.anila Conference at
1ihich the Southeast

A~ia

vefense treaty was drawn up .

Together ,lith t.he
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Secreta.'Y of State and the distingui:>ned Senator fro:t ..

11

Jersey

LH~ . ~~t~ I si~ed the treaty on behalf of the Uni ed States .

nate gave its consent to ratification by a vote of 82 to
If the Senate uill recall th

.he

~·

zituation \<mic't existed i:1

1954 v.hen t..he treaty was considered, its ...ignificance ,.,rill be

appreciated .

It i·ra;._ signed at a time when the comn:unist drive into

Indochina threatened to spil: over into the rest of SouthEa""<- Asia.
'!he treaty .,.;as intended pril:!arily to rally the wil- of other As.:.ru.
nations to protect their independence and to resist a further

ad-~ance

of co n.mist totali ~ar_;_anism .
I signed ....hat.

~
I did so

~

tr~aty

and I cast my vote for .:.ts ratificaLion.

().1

full awareness of

it~ lL~~tationv .

I signed because I believed the troaty served a useful
purpose in terms of this nat:on' s interest in peace and in freedo:- .
I believe it continues to do so .
it , the obligations which
inviolate .

And so lon'T as

~ ~a,·· as~umed

\1e

under it

remain a ..-..arvy to

~st

remain

- 19 Situations chMge, hmrever , and as they do

\-te

must be

prepared to aclju..,t this treaty as '.-roll as other policies accordingly.
1he principal limitation of the treaty uhen it uas s.i.gned , as it is
now, is that it carries too hP-avy a

re~:~~ce

Southeast Asia on nations outside the area.

for the defense of
It has , moreover , yet to

secure the participation of nations like India, .Jurma, Ceylon and
Indonesia ;;hose interest:> in the area a':"e in many ua.:y s rr.ore direct

:'in~y,

tha!1 our/ ov:n .

it has aroused some f<;)ar:;; in Southeast Asia

that the old ghost of :"iestern colonialism may emerge in a ne>v form.
~h~s~

fca~s

are unfounded but

nations •mlch have
rhe

cannot ignore their effect on the

thP.~ .

lL~tations

of the treaty have never been a secret •

nany tiMes in the

• hey have been

di..,c~ssed

is not so

thP. liritations

u~ch

·~

the~elve;

pre~3 .

n1at disturbs me

a6 the apparent

unw~llingnes~

of the Executive Branch to face them and its inert.i.a in taking steps to
deal ,.,ith th

:1 -·

- 20 ~

addition to t

~ ~ou heas~

A ia

fen

rea y , thi

country .:.s supp_yin_; niiit.a..ry aid to a nw b r of countr· es in th
re·ion to as·ist them in tuilding the def ns s of th ir national
independence .

I have supporved

progr~.~

of

ass~stance

of

thi~

!dnd .

On repeated occasions , hovreve. · , - have stros.,cd the need for extr me

~~

_~at-

caution and responsibility in employing this,....f oreign policy.
such caution and respons.:.bility 1-rere not heing employed became

unr.ri.stakably clear to me .... ast su:nn:er ;-:hen I brought to the attention of
the Senate the shoddy proce:l.ures in allocating funds under these
progra: ,..; •

The S- :1ate ..,lii.i recall that of some ·3 billion

appropriated for the year for mil.:.tary aid , the Defense Jepartment
obligated about

~700

million , or roughly 25 percent of these funds,

in the lazt 24 hours of their expiring authority to do :;;o .
vle have got to face the:·

edged

swor~ .

l'

ac

that rnili tary aid i z a t\·ro-

·Te have been told many times of its virtues .

not been suffic.:.er.tly alerted to its danger:- .

e have

- 21 -

...
o-~'

at so
r

ir.

13

~11

th

•·t~re

v~a

reports fro

~outh

part of t

he ...enate in a1 can idnes... -..hat I ua... di..'71aY d

a..,t Asia.

re..,ponsib
Accordin

apon used in vhr> 'i t

of AJ erican manufacture .

rade in ,·capons and by ..,upply "ro

by us bein
pictur

to th

~e

repor .... , no

~ ~-1

a

.inh advance in 'i tnam and ...aos

hey had

d fection an defeat.., of fore s

I

quarter., which r ached me :hil

'~

co~~

into communist hands

had armed, via th

srr.uggline

....o:-mnm.:st China.

o not knou hoH i:;ni.ficant th.' s !'actor of \reapon ... supplied

'
IS
turned against us and 'ricndly nation. •

in A

?erhap~ '~

hall n

v~r

kr.v ·•

n the total

One vhing is certain,

ho,·av r, tha it is not without significance and I hav yet to see
those •tho arc r sponsible for the administration of the e aid programs
uffic' ent a\<:ar...ne..,

de.~onstrat

of it .. oignificance .

I b l i ve this body cannot

empha~~z~

too strongly th need

o ~ extr me caution i."l tendering mi.:.itary aid to any count
least ,

~

beli v

in quantit:e

,,-e nrust

~:a

~

•

At the

e certain that it goes to governments only

an of a kind that they can use effectively to meet a

- 22 genuine military threat .

: believe further that it should o to

government:> that are striving, as i.J\ South Viet .!a'll and the
Phil~ppines ,

~he

to base thenselv s strongly in their

long run , only such

gove~~ents

o~~

p ople •

are likely to survive in

Ir.

~outheast

Asia and only such governT.ent., make reliable allies .
I turn no1't" to the second major aspect of A:nerican policy
respecting Southeast Asia which is

aid -other- than-milit~ .

I

apologize to the Senate for the u.;c of thi"' cur:.bersome term but I can
find no other.

Aid- other-than-military, as I

eurho:U. ~s as direct

.:orcP~

u~

it , embraces such

support , defense .,upport , developraent

assistance, tecrJUcal assistance,

th~

President' s ;und for As:an

econo.. i c development , all of which have been coined to describe
various activities of the government ir. providing assistance abroad .

~

I mention these terms not to embarrass the

of the Executive Branch but merely to emphasize

~n 1at

the major problem i n this aspect of our policy.
mil.i ta.17" proGram
bureaucracy.

i."'l

Sout!'least Asia, in a phrase ,

lexico~aphers
I believe to be

1he "aid- other- than~s

boc::ge do:wn in

- 23 I believe
policies
pro•i
and

o~

assist~~ce

pro-rams

r~ve

a place in the foreign

this government, provided the e!!!pha.Jis is or. rr.utuality ,

d they fill a genuine need, and provided thLy are judiciously

xper~~- adciniste~ ~ ·

~

have seen

tec~~ical

assistance

run on under a mill::.on collars as in • epal several years a.JO .

progr~~

There

a hand:'ul of kner lean technicians were performing an admirable service
in the interests of that

count~y

I have seen

and the Ur.ited Stat

others involving tens of millions of dollars '.·rhich -rerc the height of
futili .y.
I repeat , I believe this country can

sex~e

its

o~m

interests as ·rell as those of Southeast Asian countries through aid.
programs but the level of expenditures is not the real measure of
utili:..~r .

It is the 1anner in 'ilhich funds are expended that is the

critical is ... ue .
I tell the Senate frankly that ....

as I uas told

s~"veral

~~ iistu~bed

when I am :.old -

months ago -- by the Prime 'd.nister of a South-

east Asian countrJ '".hav " the improvement in relations betHeen your
countrJ
aid

a..~d

prot;r~

mine dates fro::1 the discontinuance at 'F."'.J request of your
• 11

- 24 ·mat lies behind a
tr3 an outstanding A

i~

co~ent

leader?

·o\-:

with requests froT. the Executive
...

like
are

~hat

W3

made in all sincerity

to reconcil

this fact

ranch for long- range aid prograras

and increased expenditurns?
I believe '"a must go back to the fundan:ental drives in
Southenst Asia if vre are to understand the Prime Minister' s coir.:rtent
and the existing shortco lings .:.n the aid progra!Il which,

in~~.ealA

of

correcting, the Ad.rr.i.nistration appears bent on compoundir...:;.
The
tr_: •

Southeas~

Asian peoples seek material progress , it is

They seek _;_ v, ho;-revor , ·d. thin the framework of th ~ir two other

fundal'!ental objectives , within
and responsible government .

~he

fr a!r.cworh: of national independence

I'hese objectives -- all of t-hem -- cannot

be r"'conciled UP.:i..ess the initiative for economic development in
Southca::;t Asia comes preponderantly from the peoples of that area •
• h~y do not

desi~e

a

rr~terial

proeress that is

in the United states , ir. 3ovi t Auss.:.a, or

ma~e

~mere

to order for th9m
e.se .

- 25 1h y do not de ire i.,
si e .

~o

desperate}.:· that they can be bought lT,r either

If they could , :.he:· 'rould hardly be rorth the buyint;.

pro~ram

,

oreover , no l!latter hm·r larg

Aid

the amount, no matter how much

.,cintillating surf ace progress it m..'3J· produce , lci.ll no"

~~

~~

the

'\
interests of th, people of that area or our interests unless its

the

ffect that uo rost outbid the us::;ians in offers of aid to

South astAsia
ar a .

re~l,cts

little credit on us or on the nations of that

I am sure tha.., th3 a

genuine desire to help .

~1~nt

is made in good faith , out of a

It is an argument , however , which demeans us

because it demeans the peoplee of
.,

~outheast

Asia.

5

f

''"' A

The decent ,

~he

j

self- rcsp c in;, t:1e independent in Southeast Asia \·d.ll resent the
.
~
implicat..:..on that they can be bought. .

~r•

.,_

ikfh*t

.. he argu .ent that l·re r:ust outb · d the
a

s~u~ ,

e:m

ll'e

i-..-

ussia.ns ..:..s as ir.valid

the demand that aid be limited only ..,o those 'l:ho aeree •ri th us in

every instance or v;ho speak the •.-tords which f'latter u... .

·as this

- 2" -

countr,y so · parted fro
forso ten

~heir

i~s

basic principl s, ha

training fron earliest ch "l hoo

that

g n rozi ty contingent upon a grovelling rati tude?
have, but sometin:es those
though

\'le

u~o

its citizens so

I

\·roul · :r.ake

o not thin · · ·e

speak of these r:atter... make it sou.'1d as

hA.ve .
If coi:tpetit.:.on vrith the

aid prograJil.S , neither i

ussians ir. not the sole criterion for

a.1 absolute alignment l-ti.th us or a.1 a··o.,..a ..ion

of us -- rea::. or professed -- the criterioi •
go on , at

ost , for a lifet.:...." .

Policies change .

!..eaders

he r al interest., of this r.a ....:..on

interests which members o: the SenatP mus., consider and safeguard -are nor enduring than that brief span.
In these terr.1s , the criteria of any aid progra.r:1 is: coes it
serve our interests by a.:.igning itself

r~ith

the desires of the peoples

o" 3outheast A ia for national independenc" , for material proJress , and
for responsible and hu"!'.ane gove::7l!".ent .

~egardless

hO\-f al!'iable the

r cipients , it does not serve our L'1terests if it encourages
rather than independence ; if it
gove~~nts

beco~es

to becomP increasingly irr

depc~ence

a means for irresponzible
~ponsible .

- 27 In general , I believe rational progra."lls of technical

assistance , of this government or the United 1Iations , administered
rQtnout political strings , s arve the long- range interests of this
~overmnent .

Congress spom:ored that type of activity ithen it

established the technical as .. istance progra."1 in 1950.

It is the only

type of long- ranse continuin.:; grant aid which Con cress has eYer
endorse· .
With respec:. to other aid progralns , hovrever , it seems to me
that each situation must be judged on its !1erits as i t arises .

In

certain cases , as in South Viet :I<>-'!1 for example , '\'mere a difficult
econo~c

transition is being made under constant communist pressur· ,

additional assistance

~~Y

be warranted in our interests .

Such aid

programs , ho,rever , must be clearly designed to achieve a given
over a set period of time .
co1tinuing ,

p~rpose

They shotud not carrJ an implication

g~neral co~tment

by this

o~

a

count~J .

If other foreign assistance in

econo~c develo~~cnt

is

required by Southeast Asia beyond that >.ffiich is no··: available through
existin~

ere it

fac~l~ties,

then it X3ems to me preferable vhat iv be

- 28-

4'inanc<>
a

by lon ...-ter"l loans of the

grants .

th

~outh

os

• n rou.... tcr

Loans carr-;1 no .implica ion of dc>pendency, and
ast Asian nat: or.s would pr fer

he

to

strange , to say the l east, that the agi ation for
nore

, rath r ..,han

n the Executive Branch in this

count1~

"rant~ .

~

be

ev

It is
ar·se

gran~s se.~~ vO

..,han in

~outhea~t

Asia

itself.
I should like to turn no·.., to one other question before
concluding.

Tne contention is o£ten ma'e that

~re

must increase not

only our military and nor.-military aid, but also our so-called

psychological activity.

_ a.

1ot sure that I understand 1Jrec.:.sely

what increasing psychological activ.:.ty means but ! assume it has something to do

~ri th

multiplylng the output of \-lords printed or spoken

since the Unit.ed States Information Agency is soeld.ng

50 million in

ad ' itional appropriations , or a 57 percent increase over the current
y"ar.

It

~.'Ould

be in-terest.:.ng to kno\·1 ho;-1

produced for that sum.

n:a,r,:r additional

~1ords

can be

- 29 ..;Orne years ago the able &;nator from Arka.."flsa. [;: ~ . f'ulbrighy
and the able 3~nator from Iowa

[_Er. Lickenloor

iJ

' teaded. an inv stigation

of this pro..,ram 11hich he:ped to reorga.!'lize i t on a ...ound a.'1d reasonab"'-e
ba si s .

It appears nov1 that the Administrat-ion desires to return it to

a basis of sound and furJ .
here is a ;-lac

for an intelligent infor .ation and exchange

program in supporting and dis seminating the foreign polic.:.es of this
nation in Southeast A ia.
Progra~

for the

~xchan~e

The

~lbright

of persons , for

Program and the Smith- tXmdt
exa.~le ,

nation and to the farsightedness of: the Senators

arc a credit to this
v1ho~c na.~s

they bear .

The American librari "' abroad , >-lhich the 3-Jnator from Io·;a [; ·· .
Hickenloop ·iJ 0: id so II:uch to safet,;uard a.'1d improve provide valuable
services for the country and ivs

trt .1cse
1

countries .

co~

~ce

and other relations

~dth

.,. a. sure ther~ is even a place for radio and

press and other modern informa':-ion services in supporting A:uerLcan
policies , provided they are handled 'oath intelligence and re.,traint .

- 30 here is no p:!.ace for any ·nrornation prO'!ra!J,
regardless of its intent, •·:hich sugec ts, by its very
cultural offensive on the part of this nation .

I

hm-t~ver,

ag:nitude, a

.o those

'.mo

\':oula say

that we should do more in this connection, I can only reply that in
my

opinion vmat v

a,.,e alrear!y doin

comes P"' ilously c1osr to thr>

~~~~ ~

~(j_

uhich I b-licvc uill make thi::; clear.

What l-rould be the reaction in

your state or in mine to occa io1 al visLts of Iuddhist priesJs from
Cambodia to study a .. our 'lli'lversitL.·?

I think

\-te

>rould be honored by

uc• visits, that we v:ould Helcome trem , if the visitors l:.ved -- as
they vrould -- sioply and unassur...i..ng::..yJ ir:f our midst .

I should think 1-te

would react the sa.l'de -..ray :..f they maintained in our midst a sma...0- _ibrary
to which A."'1erica.ns coul.:. go to study life and culture in th,.ir count-., .

- 31 he exa!!'lpl"'S could be .:ultipJ..ied but what .... a'!l tryin ~ to make clear is
hat t ere could be a real utility , an enrich!:: nt of our l i ~e by
activ.:.ties of that kind and .ost of us vrould l'relco:ne it .
'?ut suppose t;.;.3nty or th.:.!·t.y Ca'!lbodians descendPd on your
state l'iith the prin ..ing presses , the radios and
paraphernalia of modern co!"Tunication-.. .
day after day ,
unceasin~

J..ont.h a~tcr

r.'lonth, and year a~" .. er year to

You night acree , I

'\•r .

indeed virtuou

::lut

:r

other

Suppose they subjected you

flo.• of i·ror'l s on ,he virtues o ·

of sorr.e other

th~

Cartbod~ as,

a.'i1 ~ure,

aD

/.ff.

life and the evils

r1a"' Ca.'!lbodian life · ras

aL;o believe that you \IOuld begin to wonde::-

\'Thy t'1ese Ca.'n.bodians had come to your state and after a 1-rltile you
would begin to wonder ".·:hen they uere go in.; home .
that Ca.!nbodians ,

ur.ne<>e , or ar.y othe::- people

differently to the

prese~ce

foreigners or of an
:tatcs , .Soviet

.Shoul(

f

H"!

assume

'/ rill act any

in their nidst of a. substantial body of

of~""'l'1.3ive

of i'io::-ds 11hether it comes fro:n the United

us ·:a, or ar.y othP.r cou:. try?

- 32 .~.o

+-ho$e tl.at would

~ay

that th·

s a cheap

'ttay

to

...op

co:w.ru.nisa I can orL.y reply th re is no cheap Yay nor is th re ev n an
C)..-pensive

'ttay in

Southeast Asia i f it depends pdJnarily on the initiativ

and enere;y- of this count.r-.r.

?:o count-rJ in that region or any other region ltill avoid
tota: · ~a~ · anism primar:ly thrcugh our effor+-s .

ations find freedom

because they have the Nill to freedor.: and the native leaders to guide
them effectively to'trards .:..ts promise .
believe that •re can substitute

e~ther

··le delude ourselves i" -..·re
for that

~rill

or that leadership.

\ole '-r.i..ll cio more har:!l than good if in Southeast Asia we seek to supply

our Hords and our deeds for the \:or..:ls and deeds that nrust co1::e only
from the peoples directly involved •

. :a-. Presidel'l., - have completed my revie·: of the Southeast
Asian situatior .

I should like now ;-Vf9rly to

sur~.1ar~ze

the conclus.:..ons

in terms of our policies to · .rhich th.:., review has led me .

- 33 l.

The UniteJ. States should r.1ake clear that it stands

solidly behlnd our present obligation:; tmdPr the Southeast Asia
defense treaty .
that

At the sa:nc time , ho•,:ever , we should also make clear

'"~ ar~ lal•·tays

prepared to consider a reduction i .. our role in the

defense of that area t:nder certain condition::; .
either a recession in the totalitarian !:.hreali to
the

strangthen · n~

of its defenses by

:'he conditions are
Southea~t A~ia

~he accesJio~

or

of nations more

directly concerned to the traaty or by other defensive arrangements .
2.

The :::;;:ecutive Branch should make a careful reexan.ination

of the prenr.i.ses tmder . . rhich it dispenses military ai' .
into

it~

calculations

~ore e~phatically

It mus ... bring

than it has in the past

s~ch

factors as gcmtinc nezd and capacity of r"'cipient governments in ter.:lS
of their defense and the degree of responGibili ty '·rhich

~.hey

sho·..r to

their o·..m peoples .
Further , the

~-::ecutivc

Branch should r'3port a::;

full~r

po"sible to the American people on the extent to · rhich PJ ric an
equip;ncnt has fallen into the hands of the communists in A- · ·'!.·

as

- 34 If it

fail~

do so

vO

the near future , then thP appropriate

committees of Congress might ,.,.ell con::::ider a conplete investigation
of this matter .

3.

: on-m.:..lita.~· grant aid as a per :an nt element of A.'11erican

foreign policy should be limited , as 1·as ir.tended by Con1ress, to the
Teclmical Assistance or the Point Four
Branch presents a pro..-J:-CC'vu-

f'

,..

-~ "...._,........~

...
'l.

Prozr~u .

If the Executive

useful and effecti·_

~~~

...

xpans·o. _ o"'

r···~ - ~

this pro&ra ' /\ believe t;or.gres., should giv-e it sympathetic consideration.
Large- scale grants of econo1 ic aiel

~,o

any counLrJ , when

necessitated by unusual circumstances , ho,.,.ever, should be considered
individually or. their m·:n merits by
If

th~

th~

Congress .

3outheast Asian and other underdeveloped countries

seek long- range aid for economic development unava.:.lable through
exist.:.ng som·ccs , such aid should be considered as far as possib:e for
\":hole regions ar.d on the basis of repayable credits of the l:tost
generous terms .

The EA'3cutive

ranch should

in this connection and not seek a

perm~~ent

prc~ent

blank

specific proposals

chec.~

lmich reveals

- 35 l:ttle of the e;:tent to •lhich thi- country
the clear underGtanding of the

A~erican

· ght be

commi~ted ~:ithout

people and the consent of the

Senate and Co>: -r..;ss as a ·,.;hole .

s Information Agency
the Department of

St~te .

tr ....rords

cannot be

divorced from o r policies abroad 'llithout doing
a vt:.bst.:.tute
ubst.:.tute for sound foreign

honestly and

in · .urd and ac

its
its
in

else;i1ere are en irely out of

ordo~ .

\

